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the court denied a deduction for the telephone on the
grounds it was not an ordinary and necessary expense and
the court doubted that the telephone was used in the home
office only for business purposes.33
In conclusion
In light of the cases and rulings to date, it is clear that
employees bear a fairly heavy burden in establishing
deductibility for listed property items such as computers.
However, it is possible to succeed in obtaining a
depreciation deduction if the facts in support of
deductibility are persuasive.34
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
CONTINUOUS POSSESSION. The disputed land
was .534 acres included in the title held by the plaintiff
farmer. The land was triangular shaped and fenced on two
sides and provided access to a road to the defendant’s
residence. The defendant’s parents purchased the ranch
next to the disputed land and the fences made it appear
that the disputed land was included in the property
purchased. The defendant’s parents used the disputed land
for walking cows from pasture to the milking area,
allowing the cows to pasture temporarily on the disputed
land. The plaintiff occasionally used the disputed land for
hunting and had to climb over, under or walk around the
fence in order to enter the disputed land. The trial court
had ruled for the plaintiff because the disputed land was
not entirely fenced in. The appellate court held that the
defendant’s use of the disputed land was sufficient to
amount to actual possession given the partial fencing of
the land, since the defendant’s use would not have been
possible if the third side was fenced. However, because
the land was transferred from the defendant’s parents to
the defendant less than 21 years before the dispute and the
transferred title made no mention of the disputed land, the
defendant could not include the parents’ possession;
therefore, the defendant did not have possession long
enough to give rise to title by adverse possession. Moore
v. Duran, 687 A.2d 822 (Pa. Super. 1996).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtors had claimed a homestead
exemption for their residence under 188 Mass. Gen. Laws
§ 1. The trustee objected to the exemption to the extent of
debts incurred by the debtors prior to their filing of a
homestead declaration. The court denied the objection,
holding that Section 522(c) pre-empted the state law
limitations on the homestead exemption and allowed the
exemption as to all pre-petition debts. In re Whalen-
Griffin, 206 B.R. 277 (Bankr. D, Mass. 1997).
    Chapter 12   -ALM § 13.03.*
CLAIM . The debtor was a co-obligor with the
debtor’s parent on a secured loan. The debtor and parent
operated separate farm operations, although the
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operations shared some resources. The parent had filed a
separate Chapter 12 case and the plan provided for full
payment of the loan by the parent. The debtor objected to
the filing of a claim by the bank for the same loan,
arguing that the claim was satisfied in the parent’s
Chapter 12 case. The court held that the bank could assert
a claim in both bankruptcy cases and that the trustees in
the cases would monitor the payments and object to the
separate claims once the loan was satisfied in full. In re
McCloy, 206 B.R. 428 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtors filed for Chapter
13 and listed alleged claims of the IRS for taxes owed by
the debtor’s corporation. The IRS was mailed notices
about the bankruptcy case and participated in a hearing on
the tax claim. The IRS then sent a letter to the debtors
informing them that they would be assessed the
responsible person penalty for taxes owed by the
corporation. The debtors argued that the letter violated the
automatic stay and sought damages for attorney fees
incurred to raise the issue. The court held that the letter
was an assessment which violated the automatic stay but
denied any damage award because the debtors provided
no evidence that the attorney fees included any attempt to
solve the problem outside of the court. In re Craine, 206
B.R. 594 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
CONTRACTS
HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS . The
following is an excerpt from a case involving a hedge-to-
arrive contract. The court opinion has few facts recited.
“…Upon the  evidence  adduced by
plaintiff[cooperative] and the admission of defendant
Biron J. Smith, this Court finds that the defendant is in
breach of cash forward contracts he voluntarily
entered into with plaintiff . . .”
The court found that the contracts, being in writing,
were not in violation of the Ohio statute of frauds; that
the contracts were not executory in nature, and that
defendant was in breach for failing to perform in
accordance with the terms. It further found that
plaintiff’s contracts were not void or unenforceable.
As to the issue of fraudulent inducement, the
defendant admitted that absolutely no representations--at
least as the defendant could specifically remember--were
made to him by plaintiff or its agents upon which he
relied in executing said delivery contracts. “There can be
no fraud in the inducement….” Countrymark Co-op. v.
Smith, Case No. 96-165-OC (Ohio Com. Pleas,
Hancock Cty 1997).
A corn producer had entered into a contract to deliver
corn to be grown during a subsequent growing season.
The producer had wanted a minimum price for the corn
which the buyer refused to guarantee, but the parties
included a hedge-to-arrive contract method to help the
producer obtain the desired price. The buyer argued that
the hedge-to-arrive aspect was not a guarantee by the
buyer that the minimum price would be obtained by the
producer. After the corn was harvested and ready for
delivery, the buyer refused to pay the minimum price,
even though the buyer had made a substantial profit from
the hedge of commodity futures. The arbitrator found that,
while the producer had some expertise with commodity
futures, the producer relied on the buyer’s expertise with
the hedge-to-arrive aspect of the transaction as a means to
obtain the minimum price for the corn. The arbitrator
awarded the producer the difference between the actual
price received for the corn and the minimum price of the
contract. In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Hoffman and Farmers Elevator Co., Case No. 56 181
00459 96 (Minn. 1997).
The plaintiff grain producer had entered into hedge-to-
arrive contracts with the defendant for delivery of grain to
the defendant. The contracts contained a clause requiring
arbitration of all claims or controversies arising out of the
contract. The contracts were rolled over several times
until the defendant decided to close out the hedges. The
defendant then charged the plaintiff for the losses and the
plaintiff sought arbitration of the dispute. The defendant
argued that the arbitration clause was unenforceable
because the hedge-to-arrive contracts were illegal futures
contracts. The court held that the arbitration clause
required that the issue of illegality be determined by
arbitration and the court ordered the dispute submitted to
arbitration. Herwig v. Hahnaman-Albrecht, Inc., 1997
WL 72079 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued proposed
regulations which include the quota tobacco Endorsement
in the Common Crop Insurance Policy and restrict the
endorsement provisions to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62
Fed. Reg. 26248 (May 13, 1997).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations which
include the apple Endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions
to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62 Fed. Reg. 25140 (May
8, 1997).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations which
include the green peas Endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions
to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62 Fed. Reg. 23680 (May
1, 1997).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations which
include the peanut Endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions
to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62 Fed. Reg. 23685 (May
1, 1997).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations which
include the processing beans Endorsement in the
Common Crop Insurance Policy and restrict the
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endorsement provisions to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62
Fed. Reg. 23675 (May 1, 1997).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations which
include the fresh market tomatoes Endorsement in the
Common Crop Insurance Policy and restrict the
endorsement provisions to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62
Fed. Reg. 23628 (May 1, 1997).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations which
include the almonds Endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions
to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62 Fed. Reg. 25107 (May
8, 1997).
PEANUTS. The FSA has adopted as final regulations
implementing the Agricultural Market Transition Act of
1996 by (1) eliminating the national poundage quota
floor, (2) eliminating the undermarketing carryover
provisions, (3) establishing temporary seed quota
allocations, (4) establishing the ineligibility of certain
farms for quota allocation, (5) authorizing inter-county
transfer of farm poundage quotas, (6) eliminating the
special allocations of increased quotas for certain Texas
counties, and (7) establishing new provisions for
“considered produced” credit for transferred quotas. 62
Fed. Reg. 25433 (May 9, 1997).
TOBACCO. The CCC has adopted as final
regulations establishing the 1997 marketing quota for
flue-cured tobacco at 973.8 million pounds, with a price
support of 162.1 cents per pound. 62 Fed. Reg. 24799
(May  7, 1997).
TUBERCULOSIS. The APHIS has issued interim
regulations changing the designation of Wisconsin from
an accredited-free (suspended) state to an accredited-free
state. 62 Fed. Reg. 24801 (May 7, 1997).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ANNUAL EXCLUSION. The decedent had
established an irrevocable trust with two of the decedent’s
children as income and principal beneficiaries. The trust
was funded with a commercial building. The trust also
named 16 contingent beneficiaries, including
grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the decedent.
Under the trust, all beneficiaries and contingent
beneficiaries had the power to require distribution of up to
$10,000 annually. The power had to be exercised within
30 days after property was transferred to the trust. The
beneficiaries were notified about the transfer of the
building to the trust but no beneficiary requested any
distribution. The estate claimed that no agreement or
understanding existed that the beneficiaries would not
request distribution. The court also found that no
agreement or understanding existed and that none of the
beneficiaries believed that they would be penalized for
making a request. The court held that the beneficiaries’
interests in the trust were present interests and that the
value of the interests transferred were eligible for the
annual gift tax exclusion. Est. of Kohlsaat v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1997-212.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE. The decedent
had made a pledge to a building fund of a university. The
decedent died before making any payments under the
pledge but the estate intended to fulfill the pledge with
payment from the estate. The IRS ruled that, because the
university had an enforceable claim against the estate
under state law, the estate was entitled to a deduction for
the amount paid to the university. Ltr. Rul. 9718031,
Feb. 4, 1997.
INCOME IN RESPECT OF DECEDENT. The
decedent owned and operated a farm on two parcels of
land. The decedent’s son crop share leased the two parcels
from the decedent. Within two weeks before the
decedent’s death, the decedent and son entered into new
leases which allowed the son to pay either one-half of the
proceeds of the farm as rent or $10,000 annual rent, at the
son’s option, for parcel one. The second parcel was leased
for cash only. For six weeks after the decedent’s death the
son paid a crop share rent for parcel one, but from then on
paid the cash rent for both parcels. The executor filed a
federal income tax return for the estate and reported the
grain and livestock on the parcels with a basis equal to the
fair market value at death. This resulted in less reported
gain from the sale of the grain and livestock. The IRS
argued that the grain and livestock proceeds were income
in respect of a decedent and required the estate to use the
decedent’s lower basis in the property to determine the
amount of gain. The court agreed with the IRS, holding
that, because the rent was ordinary income to the decedent
before death and the decedent had a vested right to the
income, the rent was IRD to the estate. Although not
mentioned in the opinion, the lease was apparently a non-
material participation lease. Commodities under a
material participation share lease receive a new basis at
death under long-standing authority. Est. of Gavin v.
United States, ___ F.3d ___ (8th Cir. 1997).
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s surviving spouse elected to take the Tennessee
statutory elective share of the decedent’s estate. The
elective share was approved by the probate court and the
estate distributed property equal to the full share without
reduction for a pro rata share of the decedent’s secured
debt. Citing Estate of Williams v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. 451
(1994) which also involved the same Tennessee law, the
Tax Court held that under Tennessee law, the elective
share had to be reduced by the pro rata share of secured
debts. The appellate court reversed, citing a Tennessee
Supreme Court decision rendered subsequent to the Tax
Court decision, Estate of Williams v. Huddleston, 938
S.W.2d 415 (Tenn. 1997). The Tennessee case held that
the surviving spouse’s elective share was not liable for a
proportionate share of secured debts. The appellate court
held that because the marital share was not subject to
payment of the secured debts under state law, the estate
was entitled to a marital deduction for the entire marital
elective share of the estate. Estate of Tenenbaum v.
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Comm’r, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,269 (6th Cir.
1997), rev’g, T.C. Memo. 1995-48.
REFUND. The decedent died in 1994. The decedent
had made gifts in 1982, 1989 and 1991, of fractional
interests in real property to family members. The
fractional interests were valued by taking the fractional
interest times the fair market value of the entire property.
The 1982 and 1989 gifts were not taxed because of the
unified credit. The 1991 gifts resulted in gift tax paid by
the decedent. The decedent’s personal representative filed
a timely request for a refund, based on a revaluing of the
1991 gifts using a discount for the fractional interests
conveyed. During a meeting with the IRS after the statute
of limitations for a refund had expired, the estate sought
to revalue the 1982 and 1989 gifts as well. The estate
argued that a claim for refund for the 1991 taxes
necessarily included the 1982 and 1989 gifts because they
affected the amount of the 1991 gifts offset by the unified
credit left over from 1982 and 1989. The IRS ruled that
the 1982 and 1989 gifts could still be revalued because no
tax was paid and accepted by both the taxpayer and IRS.
However, the IRS ruled that the oral amendment of the
refund claim to include the 1982 and 1989 gifts was
considered a new claim for refund and was denied as
untimely filed. Ltr. Rul. 9718004, Jan. 7, 1997.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].*
The decedent owned and operated a farm on two parcels
of land. The decedent’s son operated the farm with the
decedent until 12 years before the decedent’s death when
the son crop share leased the two parcels from the
decedent. Within two weeks before the decedent’s death,
the decedent and son entered into new leases which
allowed the son to pay either one-half of the proceeds of
the farm as rent or $10,000 annual rent, at the son’s
option, for parcel one. The lease also granted the son the
option to purchase parcel one at a set price. The second
parcel was leased for cash only and also included a set
price purchase option. For six weeks after the decedent’s
death the son paid a crop share rent for parcel one, but
from then on paid the cash rent for both parcels. The son
received a one-seventh interest in the land under the
decedent’s will. The son exercised the option to purchase
one parcel in less than two years after the decedent’s
death and exercised the option on the seco0nd parcel just
over two years after the decedent’s death. The court held
that all of the land was eligible for special use valuation
because the qualified heirs, the other children of the
decedent retained a financial risk in the farm while the
farm was cash rented. The court reasoned that the fixed
rental was not the full rental value of the land and that the
son had the option to pay the one-half share if that was a
lower rent. In addition, the other heirs were at risk
because the son had the option to purchase the land at a
set price, independent of fair market value. Neil Harl will
publish an article on this case, critical of the decision, in
the next issue of the Digest. Est. of Gavin v. United
States, ___ F.3d ___ (8th Cir. 1997).
VALUATION. The IRS ruled that a trust holding a
residence used as a vacation home by the grantor was a
valid qualified personal residence trust. Ltr. Rul.
9718007, Jan. 22, 1997.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The IRS has issued
revised procedures for obtaining consent from the
Commissioner for accounting method changes. The
previous procedures have been simplified. The Category
A, Category B, Designated A, and Designated B
classifications were eliminated, the 90-day window at the
beginning of an examination has been eliminated, the 30-
day window for taxpayers under continuous examination
was increased to 90 days and the number of consecutive
months a taxpayer is required to be under examination
was reduced to 12 months. Rev. Proc. 97-27, I.R.B.
1997-__, __.
CAPITAL GAINS. The chairmen of the Senate
Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means
Committee have announced that the effective date of any
change in the tax rate for capital gains would be May 7,
1997 (transactions on or after that date).
CAPITAL EXPENSES. The taxpayer purchased
undeveloped land which was zoned for one residence per
acre. The taxpayer believed that the zoning designation
could be changed to allow more dense development and
challenged the constitutionality of the zoning status of the
land. The land was eventually rezoned to allow a greater
density of development. The taxpayer deducted the costs
of the rezoning effort as current business expenses. The
court held that the expenses associated with the rezoning
effort were to be capitalized in the cost of the land.
Hustead v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-205.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The
taxpayer filed an action against an employer for sex
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The parties reached a settlement of payment of
amounts for back pay. The court held that the settlement
payment was included in income because the action did
not involve tort or tort-like causes of action. The court
also held that amounts in the settlement paid directly to
the taxpayer’s attorney were also included in gross
income but were eligible for an itemized deduction.
Hardin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-202.
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].* In 1983, the
taxpayers purchased farm and ranch land which contained
about 250,000 trees and schrubs which did not produce
fruit or nuts and were not harvested for wood. The trees
and shrubs were used primarily for a windbreak but also
for soil and water conservation.  The taxpayers assigned a
$1 per plant value and claimed depreciation and
investment tax credit on the trees and shrubs. The IRS
denied the depreciation and investment tax credit. The
court held that the trees and shrubs were not eligible for
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depreciation or investment tax credit because the trees and
shrubs were not used for the production of fruit, nuts or
wood; therefore, the trees and shrubs were part of the
nondepreciable realty. The appellate court affirmed on
this point, noting that the trees and shrubs were a
deductible expense under I.R.C. § 175 which allowed the
deduction only for improvements which were not
depreciable, such as trees and shrubs used for windbreaks.
Everson v. U.S., 108 F.3d 234 (9th Cir. 1997), aff’g on
point, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,150 (D. Mont.
1995). See also Harl, “Depreciating Trees and Shrubs, 6
Agric. Law Dig. 81 (1995).
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT. Prior to formation
of a limited partnership, the general partner signed an
agreement to purchase cattle, some of which were bred
heifers. When the partnership agreement was executed 11
months later, the cattle were transferred to the partnership
with the partnership accepting the debt for the cattle. The
court held that the heifers were used Section 38 property
because the cattle gave birth prior to transfer to the
partnership. The court also held that the partners were
able to claim their share of investment tax credit for the
cattle because the cattle were placed in service for further
breeding when acquired by the partnership. Coward v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-198.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
TERMINATION. The IRS has adopted as final
regulations governing the effect of a termination of a
partnership caused by the sale or exchange of 50 percent
or more of the total interests in partnership capital and
profits. The regulations provide that, upon the
termination, the partnership is deemed to have first
transferred all of its assets and liabilities to a new
partnership in exchange for an interest in the new
partnership. The terminated partnership is deemed to have
immediately thereafter distributed the interest in the new
partnership to the purchasing partner and other remaining
partners in liquidation of the old partnership, either for
continuation of the business or dissolution. Treas. Reg. §
1.708-1(b)(1)(iv). Previously, the termination was
deemed to result in a distribution of the partnership assets
to the purchasing and remaining partners. The new rule
means that there is no longer the possibility of gain under
I.R.C. § 731(a), no change in the basis of partnership
assets, and no new five-year period for purposes of I.R.C.
§§ 704(c)(1)(B), 737. I.R.C. § 704(c) property held by the
terminated partnership continues as I.R.C. § 704(c)
property in the new partnership. Regulations under I.R.C.
§§ 704, 731, 737 were also changed to reflect the new
rules.   62 Fed. Reg. 25498 (May 9, 1997).
S CORPORATIONS
PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME. The taxpayer
was a shareholder in an S corporation and materially
participated in the management activities of the
corporation. The management activities were performed
for other corporations in which the taxpayer had a passive
interest. The taxpayer claimed income from the S
corporation as nonpassive  and sought to include the
taxpayer’s share of the expenses of the other corporations
for the management expenses as nonpassive expenses.
The IRS ruled that the expenses were passive investment
expenses because the taxpayer did not materially
participate in the other corporations. Ltr. Rul. 9718002,
Dec. 31, 1996.
TERMINATION. A corporation with stock owned by
trusts made an S corporation election but failed to file the
elections for the trusts, causing the S corporation election
to terminate. The corporation and trusts all filed returns
based on the S corporation status of the corporation. The
IRS waived the termination of the election. Ltr. Rul.
9718008, Jan. 28, 1997.
TRAVEL EXPENSES. The taxpayer resided in
Illinois and traveled to Florida for temporary employment
in construction. The taxpayer received self-employment
income for the work and claimed deductions associated
with business use of a vehicle and living expenses. The
court upheld IRS disallowance of the deductions because
the taxpayer failed to provide written records to
substantiate the claimed expenses as to amount and
purpose. Pasharikoff v. Comm’r T.C. Memo. 1997-208.
NEGLIGENCE
SALE OF LIVESTOCK. The plaintiff contracted
with a cattle producer to purchase 50 head of registered
black angus cattle. The written contract provided for one-
half payment on delivery and one-half in three months.
The seller did not file a financing statement or otherwise
perfect a security interest in the cattle. The contract also
contained a provision that the seller not inquire about
what the buyer did with the cattle after delivery. The
plaintiff resold the cattle immediately to the defendant
company but did not pay the remaining one-half of the
purchase price before filing for bankruptcy. The seller
sought recovery under a theory of negligence, arguing
that the cattle had been groomed for sale four weeks
before the sale to the company, making the cattle appear
to be recently sold, and the company, therefore, had a
duty to determine whether the plaintiff had sufficient right
to sell the cattle. The court held that the grooming of the
cattle was insufficient notice to the company to give rise
to a duty to inspect the plaintiff’s title to the animals.
Clark v. Bowling Green Livestock Market, Inc., 206
B.R. 439 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996).
PRODUCT LIABILITY
PICKUP. The plaintiffs were injured while riding in
the open cargo section of a pickup manufactured by the
defendant. The plaintiffs brought an action in negligence,
breach of warranties, misrepresentation and fraud. The
defendant raised the defense of an open and obvious
danger and the trial court granted summary judgment on
all counts for the defendant. The appellate court affirmed,
holding that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of an
issue of fact that people were not aware of the danger of
riding in the cargo area of a pickup. The appellate court
also affirmed on the other issues, holding that the
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                               87
plaintiffs failed to show that the cargo area was
negligently designed, since the cargo area could not be
designed for both passenger and cargo use. Maneely v.
General Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 1997).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
CONTINUATION FILING. The bank had acquired
a secured loan from another creditor and had filed a
continuation statement. The debtor argued that the
security interest was not perfected because the
continuation statement failed to include all of the
information in the original financing statement, since the
statement did not include a description of the collateral.
The creditor argued that the rule of substantial compliance
used for sufficiency of financing statements should also
apply to continuation filings. The court disagreed because
the statute, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 9.401, did not have
a substantial compliance provision and the statute
expressly requires the continuation to contain all the
information in the financing statement. The court also
noted that precedent had held that continuation statement
requirements should be strictly followed. Therefore, the
court held that the security interest was not perfected after
the filing of the continuation statement. In re McCloy,
206 B.R. 428 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997).
CONVERSION. The plaintiff contracted with a cattle
producer to purchase 50 head of registered black angus
cattle. The written contract provided for one-half payment
on delivery and one-half in three months. The seller did
not file a financing statement or other wise perfect a
security interest in the cattle. The contract also contained
a provision that the seller not inquire about what the buyer
did with the cattle after delivery. The plaintiff resold the
cattle immediately to the defendant company but did not
pay the remaining one-half of the purchase price before
filing for bankruptcy. The seller sought recovery for
conversion by the company which purchased the cattle
from the plaintiff. The court held that the seller
transferred sufficient title to the plaintiff such that sale to
the company was not a conversion. Clark v. Bowling
Green Livestock Market, Inc., 206 B.R. 439 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1996).
LANDLORD’S LIEN. The debtor orally rented farm
land from a parent. The parent claimed to have made
payments for the repair of the debtor’s farm equipment
and filed a secured claim for a landlord’s lien. The parent
argued that the secured claim was secured by the
equipment as well as the debtor’s crops. The statute for
the lien, Tex. Prop. Code § 54.001 allowed a lien for
money and land value supplied by a landlord for the
tenant’s growing of a crop. The parent’s testimony and
evidence failed to identify any written evidence of the
claimed repair expenses, failed to identify that the repairs
were necessary for the growing of the tenant’s crops and
failed to show that the equipment was used by the tenant.
The court held, therefore, that the landlord’s lien available
to the parent was not secured by the debtor’s equipment to
the extent of the alleged repair costs. In re McCloy, 206
B.R. 428 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
FEEDLOTS. The defendant county enacted several
ordinances which governed the construction of new large
livestock confinement feeding facilities. The ordinances
required (1) submission of an application prior to
construction detailing the information about who was
building the facility, the construction plans and
information about the drainage for the land; (2)
submission of proof of financial ability to pay for any
environmental damage from the facility; (3) acquisition of
a land application permit for the spreading of manure on
land involved; and (4) compliance with air quality
standards and emission control standards. The plaintiff
was an association of county livestock producers and
argued that the ordinances violated state law against
zoning laws which restricted agricultural use of land and
the ordinances were pre-empted by state laws governing
the various subject matters of the ordinances.  The court
held that the ordinance governing air quality was a zoning
ordinance and was void because it restricted the
agricultural use of land. However, the court upheld the
remaining ordinances as not preempted by state laws and
as valid exercises of local governance in furtherance of
state policies. Humboldt County Livestock Producers
v. Humboldt County, No. 16322 (D.C. Humboldt
County,  Iowa 1997).
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2d ANNUAL SEMINAR IN PARADISE
  
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING by Dr. Neil E. Harl
January 5-9, 1998
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1998! Balmy trade
winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand beaches and
the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar
on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl.
The seminar is scheduled for January 5-9, 1998 at the
spectacular ocean-front Hilton Waikoloa Village Resort on
the Big Island, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each
day, Monday through Friday, with a continental breakfast
and break refreshments included in the registration fee.
Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 400 page
seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning:
Annotated Materials which will be updated just prior to the
seminar.
     Here are the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment
payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation
and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date,
special use valuation, handling life insurance, marital
deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize tax
over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping
transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future
interests, handling estate freezes, and "hidden" gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including
income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private
annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part
sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living
trusts.
   • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two,
corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited
liability companies.
The Agricultural Law Press has made arrangements for
group discount air fares on United Airlines, available
through Sun Quest Vacations (1-800-367-5168--Rosalie
Nunes). In addition, attendees are eligible for substantial
discounts on hotel rooms at the Hilton Waikoloa Village
resort, the site of the seminar. Early registration is
important to obtain the lowest airfares and insure
availability of convenient flights at a busy travel time of the
year.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current
subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest or the
Agricultural Law Manual. The registration fee for
nonsubscribers is $695.
Watch your mail for a registration packet or call Robert
Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958.
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